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“Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only a 
communal existence; and not only does the meaning of each interpenetrate 
the other, but all in their aggregate take their purport from the setting in 
which they are used . . . .”2 
“Ambiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory 
context . . . .”3 
 
 
 1. ANTOINE DE SAINT EXUPÉRY, PILOTE DE GUERRE (1942) (“A rock pile ceases 
to be a rock pile the moment a single man contemplates it, bearing within him the 
image of a cathedral.”). 
       †   Carol Weissenborn is an attorney in private practice.  She focuses on 
criminal defense and immigration law and is particularly interested in the 
intersection of the two.  Ms. Weissenborn writes the Minnesota Supreme Court 
Criminal Law Blog.  She is the former Chief Public Defender of the Third Judicial 
District in southeast Minnesota.   Ms. Weissenborn is an adjunct professor at 
Hamline Law School.  She is a graduate of the University of Chicago School of 
Law. 
 2. NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2nd Cir. 1941) (L. Hand, J.). 
 3. Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994) (Souter, J.) 
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I. INTRODUCTION   
During the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 2009–10 term, 
Governor Tim Pawlenty’s appointees—Chief Justice Eric Magnuson 
and Justices G. Barry Anderson, Lorie Gildea, and Christopher J. 
Dietzen—formed the court’s fulcrum.  They voted together, at least 
in criminal cases, some fantastic percentage of the time.  They 
controlled case outcomes. 
The “majority bloc” justices share an allegiance to minimalist 
principles.  They believe that courts should yield to plausible 
judgments of the legislative and executive branches.  They value 
jurisprudential modesty.  They are averse to ambitious statements 
and broad rules.  In statutory construction, they practice a new 
textualism, which involves a concrete application of “plain 
meaning” rules.   
Two of the term’s high-profile cases, State v. Peck4—the “bong 
water” decision—and Brayton v. Pawlenty5—the unallotment case—
provide especially fruitful opportunities for an exploration of the 
court’s uses of minimalism and textualism.  The cases demonstrate 
that textualism does not exclude subjective choices, and 
minimalism does not preclude immodesty. 
Part II develops a context for the discussions of Peck and 
Brayton.6  Part II.A tests quantitatively what many people assume to 
be true—that the Pawlenty appointees form a discrete voting bloc.7  
Part II.B examines the values and conceits that underpin the bloc’s 
judicial philosophy.8  Part III analyzes State v. Peck, with a particular 
eye toward the mechanics of the conservative majority’s textualism.9  
Part IV evaluates the dissenting justices’ minimalist claims in 
Brayton v. Pawlenty.10  Part V considers the impact of Justice David R. 
Stras’s addition to the court.11  Part VI reflects on the court’s 
direction in light of cases like Peck and Brayton. 
 
 4. State v. Peck, 773 N.W.2d 768 (Minn. 2009). 
 5. Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 2010). 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. See infra Part II.A. 
 8. See infra Part II.B. 
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
 11. See infra Part V. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. A Voting Bloc 
The 2009–10 term’s iteration of the Minnesota Supreme Court 
impressed many observers as more similar to the United States 
Supreme Court—the defined blocs, the clustering around 
ideological poles—than to the avuncular, centrist Minnesota 
Supreme Court of years past.12  This article attempts to quantify this 
hypothesis to some extent by examining the court’s voting patterns 
in its 2009–10 criminal cases.  A complete roster of the criminal 
cases appears below.13  What follows is, admittedly, a limited 
assessment.  An examination of the court’s voting in all cases, civil 
and criminal, would provide a more complete and reliable measure 
of its voting trends.  Nor does my analysis permit historical 
comparisons of voting breakdowns.  Nonetheless, even this partial 
exploration should afford some insight into the contemporary 
court’s particular synergy. 
This article begins by looking at the entire pool of criminal 
cases decided during the 2009–10 term.  In twenty-seven of the 
forty-seven cases, or 57.4%, the justices were unanimous in the 
opinion.  In thirty-two of the forty-seven cases, the justices were 
unanimous in the result, for a rate of 68%. 
 
Breakdown Criminal Cases Decided, 2009–10 Term 
Unanimous in signed opinion 27 
Unanimous in final vote 
(at least one concurrence in result only) 
5 
Split decision (at least one dissent) 15 
 
A deeper fissure is suggested if you separate the first-degree 
murder direct review cases from the court of appeals discretionary 
review cases.  No winnowing of the issues takes place before the 
direct review cases reach the Minnesota Supreme Court; the cases 
are there by virtue of their status and not necessarily because they 
present consequential legal issues, though, of course, some of them 
do.  Nevertheless, as a class, they ought to be more susceptible to 
 
 12. See, e.g., Rochelle Olson, No Doubt, the State’s High Court Tilts Right; Still, 
Pawlenty Shouldn’t Count on That in the Budget Dispute, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), 
Feb. 28, 2010, at 1B (“The court isn’t unfailingly conservative yet, but its rulings 
have begun to reflect the governor’s conservative philosophy.”). 
 13. See infra Appendix. 
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consensus than the discretionary review cases.  The statistics say 
they are.  In nineteen out of twenty-nine direct review cases, or 
65.5%, the justices were unanimous in the signed opinion.  They 
were unanimous with respect to the outcome twenty-one out of 
twenty-nine times, for a rate of 73.4%.  The comparable numbers 
for the discretionary review cases are 44% and 61%, respectively. 
 
Breakdown Criminal Cases Decided: Direct Appeal Versus 
Discretionary Review, 2009–10 Term 
 Unanimous 
signed 
opinion 
Unanimous 
final vote 
Split 
Decision 
Direct Appeal/Post
Conviction 
19 2 8
Court of Appeals, 
Discretionary  
8 3 7
 
The following chart tracks each justice’s frequency in the 
majority for all criminal cases, unanimous and split, direct and 
discretionary.  Chief Justice Magnuson and Justices G. Barry 
Anderson, Gildea, and Dietzen voted with the majority (and with 
each other) more than 95% of the time.  Justice Paul Anderson 
dissented at the highest rate. 
 
Frequency in the Majority, All Cases 2009–10 Term 
Justice Majority votes Total Votes % in majority 
C. J. Magnuson 47 47 100%
J. Page 36 46 78.3%
J. P. Anderson 36 47 76.5%
J. Meyer 40 47 85.1%
J. G. B. Anderson 46 47 97.8%
J. Gildea 45 47 95.7%
J. Dietzen 44 46 95.6%
 
Next we look at frequency in the majority in the split vote 
cases, i.e., the cases in which there was at least one dissent.  As I 
have already noted, these cases constitute just 32% of the total, but 
include a disproportionate number of the court of appeals cases.  
Generally, these are more contentious cases because the court’s 
election to hear them signals its view that there is something 
unsettled or unclear in the law.  In the cases in which they could 
4
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not agree, the justices disagreed with remarkable consistency. 
 There is a marked 4-2 split on the court, with Chief Justice 
Magnuson and Justices Dietzen, Gildea, and G. Barry Anderson on 
one side and Justices Page and Paul Anderson on the other.  There 
is a less pronounced but still regular 4-3 split when Justice Meyer 
joins the minority voters.  Statistically, Justice Meyer may look like a 
swing vote—her vote is less predictable than the others’—but a true 
swing is one whose vote will sway the outcome.  Given the 
consistent voting pattern of the four-justice majority bloc, Justice 
Meyer’s vote seems unlikely to have had that effect. 
 
 
Frequency in the Majority, Split Vote Cases 2009–10 Term 
Justice Majority votes Total votes % in majority 
C. J. Magnuson 15 15 100%
J. Page 4 14 28.5%
J. P. Anderson 4 15 26.6%
J. Meyer 8 15 53.3%
J. B. Anderson 14 15 93.3%
J. Gildea 13 15 86.6%
J. Dietzen 13 15 86.6%
 
B. A Distinct Philosophy 
It is evident that there is a distinct judicial philosophy at the 
new center of gravity on the court.  That philosophy is deferential, 
self-conscious, spare, and prudent.14  It values majoritarian decision 
making above all else; its central aspiration is to safeguard the 
prerogatives of the other, (more) democratically elected 
branches.15  The dominant philosophy’s principal enterprises are 
prevention and forbearance.  It acts preventatively when it thwarts 
 
 14. See Laase v. 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe, 776 N.W.2d 431, 437 (Minn. 2009).  
Justice Gildea stated that “using judicial disagreement to satisfy the repugnancy 
exception runs afoul of the judicial modesty the constitutional principle of 
separation of powers compels. We have respected this modest role for over 100 
years.”  Id. (citing Morrison v. Mendenhall, 18 Minn. 232 (1872)).  
 15. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–23 (Yale University Press, 2d ed. 1986).  Bickel 
used the term “counter-majoritarian” in connection with his argument that 
judicial review is illegitimate because it allows unelected judges to overrule the 
decisions of elected representatives.  Id. 
5
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lower court decisions that encroach on legislative values.  Chief 
Justice Magnuson enforced this principle in one of last term’s two 
child protection representation funding cases: “[T]o the extent 
that the district court based its decision on its perception of the 
relative abilities of the county and the State Board of Public 
Defense to raise funds, rather than on the applicable statutes,” the 
Chief Justice intoned, “the court erred.  The Legislature makes 
such policy decisions, and expresses its judgment, in statutes, which 
courts apply.”16   
The court acts forbearingly when it declines itself to augment 
or interfere with legislative judgments.  In last term’s Laase v. 2007 
Chevrolet Tahoe, a forfeiture case, both Justices Gildea and G. Barry 
Anderson explained in unusually explicit language why they 
declined to mediate between a perceived injustice and a debatable 
legislative judgment.17  Justice Gildea wrote for the majority that: 
 
We recognize that the result in this case may be open to 
question on policy grounds, and we do not disagree with 
Justice Paul Anderson’s [dissenting] view about the 
importance of private property rights.  But in the absence 
of a constitutional challenge, which we do not have in this 
case, it is the role of the legislature, not the courts, to 
rewrite the statute to provide greater protection for 
private property.  The public policy arguments therefore 
should be advanced to the legislature, the body that 
crafted the language that compels the result here.18 
 
Justice G. Barry Anderson acknowledged in his concurring 
opinion in Laase that: 
 
[T]here is reason to question the balance struck by the 
legislature between various competing interests.  For 
example, given the general disfavor of forfeiture statutes, 
the wisdom of vesting the right to possession of a forfeited 
vehicle in the law enforcement agency responsible for the 
arrest of a defendant and the forfeiture of a defendant’s 
vehicle is not immediately evident.  But such issues are for 
the legislature to address, not this court.19  
 
 16. In re Welfare of J.B., 782 N.W.2d 535, 548 (Minn. 2010). 
 17. Laase, 776 N.W.2d at 440.  
 18. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 19. Id. (Anderson, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
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If the majority quartet’s core value is the preservation of 
democratic decision making, its core practice is a form of judicial 
minimalism.  Generally, minimalists prefer to avoid broad rules and 
abstract theories, focusing only on what is necessary to decide a 
case.20  If courts do less and articulate fewer reasons for their 
decisions, there is greater opportunity for action and explanation 
by democratically accountable actors in the public domain.21  That 
is the theory.  It is jurisprudence that intends to tread lightly, but 
sometimes it winds up looking like jurisprudence that is 
determined not to leave a mark. 
Last term’s State v. Sanders introduced the problem whether 
the recording requirement set forth in State v. Scales22 applies when 
a law enforcement agency takes a custodial statement outside of 
Minnesota.23  The majority opinion by Justice G. Barry Anderson 
folds around and into itself to avoid answering this question.  “If 
the jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to the district court’s 
admission of . . . testimony regarding the statements Sanders 
allegedly made to the FBI,” Justice Anderson reasons, “we need not 
address whether the Scales recording rule applies to a custodial 
interrogation conducted outside Minnesota or whether the alleged 
Scales violation in this case was substantial.”24   
In other words, the court does not have to reach the central 
issue if it can dispose of the case with harmless-error analysis.  But 
which harmless-error rule should be applied—the one that comes 
into play when the evidence admitted affects constitutional rights 
 
 20. Cass R. Sunstein, Forward: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 
14 (1996).  Writing for the majority in State v. Carufel, 783 N.W.2d 539, 544 nn.2–3 
(Minn. 2010), Justice Dietzen chastises concurring Justice Paul Anderson for what 
Justice Dietzen views as excessively broad theorizing about the “park zone” 
enhancement in the controlled substance statutes.  The concurrence, writes 
Justice Dietzen, “loses sight of the issue before the court . . . . [T]he concurrence 
presents a hypothetical 8-block area that is not before the court . . . . Our decision 
is limited to the actual facts presented and not a hypothetical illustration that is 
materially different.”  Id. at n.3; see State v. Taylor, 650 N.W.2d 190, 203 n.11 
(Minn. 2002) (declining to respond to the argument of the concurrence/dissent 
because it would require the court to render an advisory opinion); see also State v. 
Wertheimer, 781 N.W.2d 158, 162 (Minn. 2010), (beamoaning Justice G. Barry 
Anderson’s view of the “apparently broad statements in our case law” with respect 
to the time computation statute).  
 21. Sunstein, supra note 20, at 7. 
 22. State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592–93 (Minn. 1994). 
 23. See State v. Sanders, 775 N.W.2d 883 (Minn. 2009). 
 24. Id. at 887. 
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or the less stringent standard of review for evidence with no 
constitutional overtones?  Like the Scales court, the Sanders court 
passes on the question of whether Scales implicates rights under the 
due process clause of the Minnesota Constitution.25  “In this case, 
we need not, and do not, decide which harmless-error standard 
applies to a district court’s erroneous admission of statements 
made during an unrecorded custodial interrogation because even 
under the more favorable constitutional harmless-error standard 
Sanders was not prejudiced by the district court’s admission of 
[the] testimony.”26  Therefore, “[w]e need not, and do not, decide 
whether the Scales recording rule applies to a custodial 
interrogation conducted outside Minnesota or whether the alleged 
Scales violation in this case was substantial.”27  That is a lot of need-
not and do-not from the state’s highest court.  For the next district 
court judge faced with the decision whether to admit an 
unrecorded confession obtained outside Minnesota, there is no 
guidance available from the Minnesota Supreme Court.  In the 
name of judicial economy, the decision costs have simply been 
passed on to the lower courts.28 
Minimalism is the majority quartet’s defining practice; 
narrowness is its methodology.  One trait of the Magnuson court is 
its preference for deciding cases based on close, literal readings of 
the textual material.  In State v. Lopez, a case in which a unanimous 
court articulated new limits on the reach of the predatory offender 
registration statute, Chief Justice Magnuson explains, 
characteristically, that “[w]e find the answer to the issue in this case 
in the text of [the registration statute]. . . .  The district court and 
the court of appeals read the statute more broadly than its 
 
 25. See Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 592 (“We choose not to determine at this time 
whether under the Due Process Clause of the Minnesota Constitution a criminal 
suspect has a right to have his or her custodial interrogation recorded.  Rather, in 
the exercise of our supervisory power to insure the fair administration of 
justice, we hold that all custodial interrogation including any information about 
rights, any waiver of those rights, and all questioning shall be electronically 
recorded where feasible and must be recorded when questioning occurs at a place 
of detention.”) (footnote omitted). 
 26. Sanders, 775 N.W.2d at 888. 
 27. Id. at 888–89.  
 28. Sunstein, supra note 20, at 17 (stating “[a] court that economizes on 
decision costs for itself may in the process ‘export’ decision costs to other people, 
including litigants and judges in subsequent cases who must give content to the 
law”).  
8
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language permits.”29  
The narrowing trend, however, goes beyond simple fidelity to 
the words of statutes.  The conservative justices are contracting the 
rules and norms of statutory construction.  William Eskridge uses 
the shorthand “new textualism” to describe a process of statutory 
construction championed by United States Supreme Court Justice 
Antonin Scalia.30  New textualism says that once a court ascertains a 
statute’s plain meaning, consideration of legislative history is 
irrelevant.31  On its face, this idea is neither new nor novel; 
Minnesota’s “plain meaning” statute, Minnesota Statutes section 
645.16, has remained in effect, unchanged, since 1941.  It states: 
The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is 
to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.  
Every law shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to 
all its provisions. 
When the words of a law in their application to an existing 
situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter 
of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of 
pursuing the spirit. 
When the words of a law are not explicit, the intention of 
the legislature may be ascertained by considering, among 
other matters: 
(1) the occasion and necessity for the law; 
(2) the circumstances under which it was enacted; 
(3) the mischief to be remedied; 
(4) the object to be attained; 
(5) the former law, if any, including other laws upon the 
same or similar subjects; 
(6) the consequences of a particular interpretation; 
(7) the contemporaneous legislative history; and 
(8) legislative and administrative interpretations of the 
statute.32  
 
 
 
 
 29. See State v. Lopez, 778 N.W.2d 700, 706 (Minn. 2010). 
 30. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 621 
(1990) (stating that “[a] statute’s text is the most important consideration in 
statutory interpretation, and a clear text ought to be given effect”). 
 31. Id. at 623.    
 32. MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2008).  
9
Weissenborn: Rocks rather than Cathedrals: The Minimalist Architecture of the
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
  
2011] ROCKS RATHER THAN CATHEDRALS 891 
What seems to be changing, at least in Minnesota, is not the 
idea that explicit statutes speak for themselves so much as the 
meaning of plain meaning.  What is changing, specifically, is the 
way that a majority of the court understands ambiguity.   
Minnesota’s test for ambiguity is whether a statute’s language 
is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.33  This 
ambiguity test itself is standardless, subjective, and discretionary.34  
How is “reasonable” defined?  By what quantum of proof must 
reasonableness be demonstrated?  Are statutes subject to plural 
reasonable interpretations every time litigating parties disagree 
about their meaning?  If this standard is too broad, what is the right 
one?  The choice to declare a statue unambiguous connotes a 
certain Olympian objectivity and value-neutrality, but it is a 
decision that conceals its true nature.  Whether language is subject 
to more than one reasonable construction is entirely a matter of 
judicial judgment. 
The most significant legal decisions of the Peck majority and 
the Brayton minority are their determinations of nonambiguity.  As 
we will see, those so-called threshold determinations go a long way 
toward concluding their analyses. 
III. STATE V. PECK: WORDS AS ROCKS 
State v. Peck, the “bong water” decision, was easily the term’s 
most notorious case.35  It inspired a rallying cry in opposition,36  a 
public relations gaffe,37 and punch lines by the score.38  The 
 
 33. See, e.g., State v. Mauer, 741 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn. 2007). 
 34. See Brian G. Slocum, The Importance of Being Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, 
Stare Decisis, and the Central Role of Ambiguity Determinations in the Administrative State, 
69 MD. L. REV. 791 (2010) (exploring the concept of ambiguity in judicial review of 
executive branch agency determinations). 
 35. 773 N.W.2d 768 (Minn. 2009). 
 36. Legislation that would have largely overruled Peck passed unanimously in 
the Minnesota Senate and passed the Minnesota House by a vote of 129-2.  See S.F. 
3145, 86th Leg., 1st Engrossment (2009–2010) (“The weight of fluid used in a 
water pipe may not be considered in measuring the weight of a mixture except in 
cases where the mixture contains four or more fluid ounces of fluid.”).  On May 
18, 2010, Governor Pawlenty vetoed the legislation, explaining that the bill “waters 
down current criminal justice practices and standards.”  Letter from Governor Tim 
Pawlenty, Governor of Minn., to Senator James Metzen, President of the Minn. 
Senate (May 18, 2010), available at http://www.governor.state.mn.us/stellent
/groups/public/documents/web_content/prod010002.pdf. 
 37. See Minnesota: Bong Water Called Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2009, at A20, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/23/us/23brfs-BONGWATERCAL_BRF.html.  
 38. See, e.g., Beth Hawkins, Joking Aside, Is Bong Water a Drug in Minnesota?, 
10
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criticism of Peck has been so widespread that it is tempting to 
dismiss the decision as haphazard or an aberration—as something 
other than a serious effort by smart, diligent justices to do exactly 
what they did.39  It would be a mistake to think of the case this way.  
In fact, Peck offers a frank look at the mechanics of the linear 
textualism that now commands a majority of the court. 
On the day they searched Sara Peck’s home, Rice County 
Sheriff’s Department deputies discovered—in addition to Ms. 
Peck’s bong—a baggy containing a grainy substance, plus a second 
baggy, scale, spoon, and pipe; all bearing evidence of drug debris.40  
Compared to this other material, Minnesota’s most renowned bong 
may well have looked like an afterthought to the deputies, but they 
dutifully preserved the liquid and sent it along with all the other 
items to the crime lab for testing.41  The bong water did not look 
like a trifle to the Rice County Attorney.  Because of it, he charged 
Peck with a first-degree controlled-substance crime,42 carrying a 
maximum of thirty years imprisonment and a $1 million fine.43  
Specifically, he alleged that Peck possessed a “mixture” of 
 
MINNPOST.COM (June 23, 2010), http://www.minnpost.com/stories/2010/06/23
/19060/joking_aside_is_bong_water_a_drug_in_minnesota.  Hawkins described 
Governor Pawlenty’s June 10, 2010, interview with Jon Stewart on “The Daily 
Show”:  
For his part, Stewart took a stab at explaining to Pawlenty that marijuana 
smokers won’t touch [bong water]—although sometimes it’s funny to put 
bong water in empty beer bottles and watch your stoned friends find 
them.  
“My point is, bong water is, uh, very heavy, but it’s not part of the drug 
thing,” he explained. “You’ve really got to go with what’s in the bowl.  It’s 
a big issue.”  
The audience cheered, but Pawlenty refused to cede ground. “This is a 
pro-bong-water audience,” he jibed. 
“Dude,” Stewart intoned. “You have no idea.” 
Id.; see also Emily Kaiser, Bong Water is an Illegal Drug, Minn. Supreme Court Rules, 
Oct. 22, 2009, http://blogs.citypages.com/blotter/2009/10/bong_water_is_a.php.  
Kaiser wrote: “Time to dump your bong water in case the feds show up at your 
door.  They might think you actually plan to drink it later. . . . We just puked a 
little.”  Id. 
 39. The editor-in-chief of Minnesota Lawyer, a nonpartisan, mainstream legal 
periodical, referred to Peck on the newspaper’s blog as the “now infamous Bong 
water case.”  Mark Cohen, Justice Paul Anderson on Bongs, MINNLAWYER BLOG (June 
22, 2010), http://minnlawyer.com/minnlawyerblog/2010/06/22/justice-paul-
anderson-on-bongs/. 
 40. Peck, 773 N.W.2d at 769. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. MINN. STAT. § 152.021, subdiv. 3(a) (2008). 
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something that contained methamphetamine and weighed more 
than twenty-five grams.44  The legal issue for the court was whether 
the bong water counted as a “mixture” under the statute.45  
In deciding this question, the court divided 4-3 in the expected 
manner.46  Justice G. Barry Anderson’s majority opinion, joined by 
Chief Justice Magnuson and Justices Gildea and Dietzen, is slender: 
it takes up only five pages, and half of these are devoted to a 
summary of the facts and proceedings below.47  The core of the 
majority’s analysis requires just two paragraphs, which are 
reproduced here in full: 
 
The State argues that the statutory definition of “mixture” 
is unambiguous.  We agree. 
 Minnesota Statutes § 152.01, subdivision 9a, defines 
“mixture” as “a preparation, compound, mixture, or 
substance containing a controlled substance, regardless of 
purity.”  A “preparation” is a “substance, such as a 
medicine, prepared for a particular purpose.”  The 
American Heritage Dictionary 1386 (4th ed. 2000).  A 
“compound” is a “combination of two or more elements 
or parts.”  Id. at 379.  A “mixture” is “[s]omething 
produced by mixing.”  Id. at 1128.  A “substance” is “[t]hat 
which has mass and occupies space; matter.  A material of 
a particular kind or constitution.”  Id. at 1726. 
 
 We conclude that when applied to the water containing 
methamphetamine stored in the bong, the phrase 
“preparation, compound, mixture, or substance” is clear 
and free from all ambiguity.  Bong water is plainly a 
“substance” because it is material of a particular kind or 
constitution.  The bong water is a “mixture” because it is a 
“substance containing a controlled substance”—
methamphetamine.48 
 
 
 
 
 44. Peck, 773 N.W.2d at 769–70; see also MINN. STAT. § 152.021, subdivs. 2(1), 
3(a) (2008). 
 45. Peck, 773 N.W.2d at 771. 
 46. See id. at 769. 
 47. Id. at 769–73. 
 48. Id. at 772. 
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss2/10
  
894 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:2 
The majority’s logic demonstrates how a court’s determination 
of unambiguousness can work to bring a case to a blunt conclusion.  
The majority conflates the identification and resolution of 
ambiguity into a single step.49  It commingles decision and analysis 
until they are fused into an impenetrable circle: the statute is 
unambiguous because bong water is a substance, and bong water is 
a substance because the statue is unambiguous.  The decision to 
declare the statutory language unambiguous effectively decides the 
case. 
If, as the majority’s argument implies, literalness is the 
touchstone, how shall it be maintained as a literal matter—that the 
words of section 152.01, subdivision 9a and 152.021, subdivision 
2(1), as applied to two-and-a-half tablespoons of water sitting in a 
bong, do not lend themselves to other reasonable interpretations?50  
Two lower courts and the Peck supreme court dissenters thought 
they did.51  All three entities looked at section 152.01’s definition of 
drug paraphernalia—namely, “materials of any kind” used in 
ingesting controlled substances52—and wondered, sensibly, why 
bong water does not constitute drug paraphernalia, rather than a 
mixture.53  The court of appeals also deemed it a reasonable 
construction that “preparation, compound, mixture, or substance” 
excludes a water-based combination.54  The supreme court majority 
adjudged that no other reasonable interpretation presented itself.55  
The majority’s was not a necessary decision.  It was discretionary, 
reflecting the values and preferences of the justices who made it.  It 
posed, however, as something else—as compulsory, objective, 
disinterested, and inevitable.  Its subjectivity was covert. 
 
 49. See Slocum, supra note 34, at 794. 
 50. Peck, 773 N.W.2d at 774 (Paul Anderson, J., dissenting).  Justice Paul 
Anderson’s dissent includes the information that “[t]he amount of liquid seized, 
37.17 grams, equals approximately two and one-half tablespoons of water.”  Id.  
 51. See id. at 775–79; State v. Peck, 756 N.W.2d 510, 516 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2008), rev’d, 773 N.W.2d 768 (Minn. 2009) (finding that “the post-use byproduct 
of a methamphetamine bong is not a ‘mixture’”). 
 52. MINN. STAT. § 152.01, subdiv. 18 (2008) (“‘[D]rug paraphernalia’ means 
all equipment, products, and materials of any kind . . . used primarily in . . . 
injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the human body a 
controlled substance . . . .”). 
 53. See Peck, 773 N.W.2d at 778 (Paul Anderson, J., dissenting); Peck, 756 
N.W.2d at 515 (stating “[w]e also note, as did the district court, that the broad 
definition of ‘drug paraphernalia’ in the controlled-substance statute . . . tends to 
create ambiguity”). 
 54. Peck, 756 N.W.2d at 514–15. 
 55. Peck, 773 N.W.2d at 773. 
13
Weissenborn: Rocks rather than Cathedrals: The Minimalist Architecture of the
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
  
2011] ROCKS RATHER THAN CATHEDRALS 895 
Justice Paul Anderson argues in dissent that the contemporary 
court is altering traditional rules and norms of statutory 
construction.  There are, he emphasizes, dual clauses in section 
645.16’s pivotal sentence: “When the words of a law in their 
application to an existing situation are clear and free from all 
ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the 
pretext of pursuing the spirit.”56  However, 
[i]n recent years, our statement of the statutory 
interpretation standards has focused more on the latter 
part of this sentence than on the former.  In our efforts to 
ensure that we are not disregarding the “letter of law . . . 
under the pretext of pursuing the spirit,” we have often 
lost sight of considering the words of a statute in their 
application. 
 Under this more recent, more narrow review, we have 
begun to focus on a statute’s “language” as the majority 
does here . . . . 
 Focusing on the “language, on its face” permits the 
majority to declare the statutory language at issue in this 
case is unambiguous based on a dictionary definition.  Of 
course, every word used in a Minnesota law has a 
dictionary meaning, so if the majority’s plain-meaning 
approach is taken to its logical conclusion, no word is 
ambiguous.57   
Dictionary meanings suffer from what one commentator terms 
a “fundamental indeterminacy.”58  They exist outside the statutory 
framework, unmoored to and heedless of statutory content and 
context.59  Their affiliation with statutory meanings is essentially 
flawed.60  This phenomenon of indeterminacy and attenuation is 
compounded by the Peck majority’s selective literalism: “mixture” is 
stringently, literally defined; “reasonable” is not.61  The court opens 
itself up to criticism that its finding of unambiguousness had less to 
do with the language of the statute than with how its finding would 
resolve the case.   
 
 
 56. Id. at 777 (citing MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2008)). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 1437, 1445 (1994). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Peck, 773 N.W.2d at 772. 
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Nevertheless, dictionaries appear to be carrying the day on the 
Minnesota Supreme Court.  In the linear textualism of the 
majority, the decision that language is unambiguous means that 
judges are free to treat words as rocks.  The possession of bong 
water is a felony carrying penalties reserved for the most dastardly 
drug kingpins; and words are rocks, pebbles in alien juxtaposition.  
They have only a solitary existence, the meaning of one never 
interpenetrating the others.  Neither singly, nor in the aggregate, 
do they draw any purpose from the setting in which they are used. 
IV. BRAYTON V. PAWLENTY: REORDERING THE ROCKS 
In Brayton v. Pawlenty,62 the unallotment case, a controversy 
about power sharing between the executive and legislative 
branches became the vehicle for the Minnesota Supreme Court to 
debate its own legitimate role in the constitutional order.  The case 
featured an interesting split between proponents of judicial 
restraint.  Chief Justice Magnuson parted company with the other 
members of the quartet to join Justices Paul Anderson, Page, and 
Meyer in voting to block the governor’s unallotments.63  Chief 
Justice Magnuson authored the majority opinion;64 Justice Gildea 
authored the dissent.65 
Justice Gildea’s dispute with the majority, and specifically with 
Chief Justice Magnuson, is an argument about minimalist 
orthodoxy.66  Justice Gildea castigates the majority for failing to 
make a finding of unambiguousness: 
The majority is unable to [apply the law as written by the 
legislature] because the language the Legislature used in 
the unallotment statute leaves the majority with 
uncertainty and ambiguity.  The majority therefore 
rewrites the statute to insert additional conditions, and 
then finds that the Commissioner of Minnesota 
Management and Budget (Commissioner) violated the 
statute because he did not comply with the conditions the 
 
 62. Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357 (2010). 
 63. Id. at 368. 
 64. Id. at 358. 
 65. Id. at 370 (Gildea, J., dissenting). 
 66. The challenge feels distinctly personal.  In the opening paragraph of the 
dissent, Justice Gildea intonated that “[t]he judiciary’s ‘duty’ is simply ‘to apply the 
law as written by the legislature’” and then appended the information that the 
source for the original quote was “Magnuson, C.J. for a unanimous court.”  Id. 
(citation omitted). 
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majority has added.67 
. . .  
[T]he majority divines that what the Legislature meant to 
say was that once a balanced budget has been enacted 
into law and a deficit thereafter occurs, the Commissioner 
may unallot to make up that deficit.  The obvious problem 
with this rewrite is that it is a rewrite.68 
The dissent’s criticism notwithstanding, it is the majority 
opinion in Brayton that impresses for its rectitude, and the 
dissenting opinion that comes across as immodest.  It is the 
dissenters who take liberties with the text, who reach to impose 
their will, and not the other way around. 
Brayton dealt with the meaning of two triggering conditions 
that are prescribed in the unallotment statute, Minnesota Statutes 
section 16A.152, subdivision 4.69  These conditions are the state 
budget commissioner’s determinations that (1) “probable receipts 
for the general fund will be less than anticipated” and (2) “the 
amount available for the remainder of the biennium will be less than 
needed.”70  The statute does not explicitly answer the question 
when these determinations are to be made.  Anticipated when? 
 Remainder measured from what point in time?  The statute does 
not say. 
Whether receipts were “less than anticipated” presents, in the 
first instance, a factual question.  It is reasonable to expect that a 
minimalist, noninterfering court would pride itself on taking the 
facts where it finds them.  To do otherwise—to omit, ignore, or 
deliberately manage, sculpt, or stage the facts—effectively 
insinuates a court into the merits.  It converts a passive court into 
an active one.  It makes the court a player. 
The majority opinion recounts the events that culminated in 
the executive branch unallotments (author’s numbering): 
1. In November 2008, Minnesota’s budget commissioner 
forecast a 2010–11 biennium deficit of $4.847 billion.71 
2. In February 2009, the commissioner forecast a deficit of 
$4.57 billion.72  
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 372. 
 69. Id. at 360 (majority opinion). 
 70. MINN. STAT. § 16A.152, subdiv. 4(a) (2008) (emphases added). 
 71. Brayton, 781 N.W.2d at 359. 
 72. Id. 
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3. In January 2009, the governor submitted a proposed 
budget with anticipated revenues of $31.07 billion.73 
4. In March 2009, the governor submitted a revised budget 
with anticipated revenues of $29.905 billion.74 
5. In April 2009, the commissioner updated its 
information to reflect that February and March 
revenues were $46 million less than projected in the 
February forecast.75 
6. “On May 9, 2009, the governor vetoed a revenue bill 
that increased taxes in order to meet the anticipated 
revenue shortfall.”76 
7. Between May 4 and May 18, the legislature passed 
appropriation bills that reduced spending below the 
levels projected in the February 2009 forecast; the 
projected $4.57 billion deficit was reduced to $2.7 
billion.77 
8. “The governor signed the appropriations bills into 
law.”78 
9. “On May 18, 2009, the day it was required to adjourn,” 
the legislature passed a revenue bill that would raise 
taxes to address the $2.7 billion remaining deficit.79 
10. The governor vetoed the second revenue bill.80 
11. The legislature had adjourned by the time of the veto.81 
12. “The Governor did not call a special session of the 
legislature.”82 
13. On June 4, 2009, the commissioner informed the 
governor by letter that the unallotment conditions had 
been satisfied; namely, the commissioner had 
determined that “probable receipts for the general fund 
will be less than anticipated, and that the amount 
available for the remainder of the 2010–11 biennium 
‘will be less than needed.’”83 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. at 360. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 360–61. 
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14. “The Governor approved proposed unallotments of 
approximately $2.5 billion on July 1, the first day of the 
biennium.”84 
15. The commissioner implemented the unallotments 
beginning in July 2009.85  “Some of the unallotments 
were effective for both the first and second years of the 
biennium,” and some were effective only for the 
second.86 
16. The commissioner reduced allotments to the Minnesota 
Supplemental Aid program (which includes the specific 
Special Diet program challenged in Brayton) by $2.866 
million for FY 2010 and $4.3 million for FY 2011.87 
17. “The effect of these unallotments was to eliminate 
Special Diet Program payments from November 1, 2009, 
through June 20, 2011, the end of the biennium.”88 
The dissent’s version of the facts dramatically downplays events 
three, four, five, six, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, fourteen, fifteen, and 
sixteen.  Justice Gildea’s initial factual recitation fails to mention 
that the governor twice vetoed revenue bills that were intended to 
meet the shortfall, that the second veto followed the legislature’s 
mandated adjournment date, that thereafter the governor declined 
to call the legislature into special session, that the governor 
approved and ordered the unallotments on the first day of the 
2010–11 biennium, and that the cuts to the Special Diet Program 
formed part of a larger Minnesota Supplemental Aid unallotment 
of $2.866 million for all of FY 2010.89  Justice Gildea refers to some 
of these events in the body of her argument, but only in the most 
cursory manner.90 
The point of including the information in points three, four, 
five, six, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, fourteen, fifteen, and sixteen is 
not, as the dissent dismissively asserts, to cast blame about “[w]hich 
of the two coordinate branches of government is responsible for 
 
 84. Id. at 361. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See id. at 371 (Gildea, J., dissenting). 
 90. Id. at 372 (“[R]espondents contend that when the Governor signed 
appropriation legislation and vetoed revenue legislation, the Governor (and 
therefore the Commissioner) knew that the state would not have funds sufficient 
to satisfy the financial obligations in the appropriation legislation.”). 
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the budget shortfall.”91  These things matter because the court was 
obliged to make mixed factual-legal determinations that turned on 
these events.  The dissent erased pertinent facts that were 
inconvenient to its analysis. 
Regarding the two triggering conditions in section 16A.152, 
subdivision 4, namely, that “probable receipts for the general fund 
will be less than anticipated,” and that “the amount available for the 
remainder of the biennium will be less than needed,” the majority finds 
that, lacking express temporal benchmarks, the statute is 
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, and is 
therefore ambiguous.92  The court ultimately endorses the 
respondents’ interpretation, which construes the statute in a 
commonsense fashion that ascribes real meaning to all of the words 
that actually appear there. 
 
The common meaning of “remainder” is . . . something 
less than the whole, after part of the whole has been 
removed or consumed.  Accordingly, the requirement 
that the Commissioner find that “the amount available for 
the remainder of the biennium will be less than 
needed,” . . . reasonably means that the triggering 
circumstance (amount less than needed) cannot logically 
be met until some of the biennium has passed, and that 
the unallotment process can never apply to a full 
biennium.93 
 
Moreover, continues the court, the two clauses “are joined by 
the conjunctive ‘and’; when read together, the natural conclusion 
is that the determination about receipts being ‘less than 
anticipated’ must be related to ‘the amount available for the 
remainder of the biennium.’”94 
Citing Peck, Justice Gildea argues in dissent that the statute is 
unambiguous.95  The statute, she insists, is clear on its face, and it 
can be applied “as it is written” to uphold the executive branch’s 
unallotments.96  Were probable receipts less than anticipated?  The 
dissent says, incredibly, yes.  All that is required, writes Justice 
 
 91. Id. at 373. 
 92. Id. at 364 (majority opinion) (emphases added). 
 93. Id. at 363–64. 
 94. Id. at 364. 
 95. Id. at 372–73 (Gildea, J., dissenting). 
 96. Id. 
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Gildea, is that the commissioner “make this determination before 
he unallots.”97  The statute “does not provide any other deadline by 
which the Commissioner is to make this determination.”98  The 
dissent simply avoids answering when, exactly, the budget shortfall 
was unanticipated.  When the governor vetoed the first revenue 
bill?  The second?  When he declined to call the legislature back 
into special session?  These are all facts that largely fell out of the 
dissent’s narrative.  The budget shortfall was not just anticipated; it 
was front-and-center in the participants’ minds throughout the 
legislative season.99  Given Justice Gildea’s espoused commitment to 
applying the “plain language” of the unallotment statute, should 
not the dissenters have come down the opposite way? 
One fact the dissent omits is that the governor approved the 
unallotments, including the FY 2010 unallotment to the Minnesota 
Supplemental Aid program, which includes the Special Diet 
Program, on July 1, 2009, the first day of the biennium.100  This is 
crucial information for purposes of ascertaining the effect of the 
word “remainder” on the unallotments’ legality.  Instead, Justice 
Gildea fixes on the fact that the withholding of funds for the 
Special Diet Program did not occur until November 1, 2009.  She 
writes: 
 
The only question presented in this case is whether the 
decision to unallot funds from the Special Diet Program 
complies with the statute.  As to the Special Diet Program, 
the Commissioner determined that “the amount available 
for the remainder of the biennium will be less than 
needed”; that is, the amount available, starting November 
1, would be less than needed to fund the Special Diet 
Program for the remainder of the biennium.  Further, 
there is no dispute that the Special Diet Program funds 
were not unallotted until November 1.  The 
Commissioner’s determination that there would be 
insufficient funds for this program was, indisputably, only 
with respect to a portion of the biennium and not the 
entire biennium.  We therefore have no occasion in this 
 
 97. Id. at 373. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See, e.g., Patricia Lopez & Mike Kaszuba, Minnesota’s Budget Deficit: $4.57B, 
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Mar. 4, 2009, at 1A (predicting “hard-edged conflict at 
the State Capitol as leaders attempt to climb out of the deepest fiscal valley in 
generations”).  
 100. See Brayton, 781 N.W.2d at 361. 
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case to determine whether decisions to unallot that were 
effective on the first day of the biennium violate the 
statute.101 
 
The executive unallotment order concerning the Special Diet 
Program was given on July 1, 2009.102  It was part of a larger FY 2010 
unallotment of the Minnesota Supplemental Aid program.103  The 
Special Diet Program did not actually lose funds as a result of the 
governor’s order until November 1, 2009––the implementation 
date––but the operative decision was made on the first day of the 
biennium.104  The dissent appears to have purposefully made a hash 
of these facts.  This stratagem allows Justice Gildea to shrink the 
issue so dramatically that the troublesome “remainder” question is 
simply removed from the frame. 
It is minimalist credo that issues are to be framed narrowly. 
 The aspirational rationale for doing so is to curtail judicial 
incursion into the decision making of the other branches and to 
leave as much as possible open for democratic deliberation.  It is 
difficult to square these purposes with what the dissent has actually 
done in Brayton.  It took a bold act to force the remainder issue into 
so artificially narrow a container.  It took boldness to edit the 
factual record as liberally as the dissenters did.  In particular, it is 
hard to square the dissent’s exclusion of the facts describing the 
process of democratic deliberation with a judicial aspiration to 
promote the same.  The dissent’s methods in Brayton suggest not 
prudence, but its opposite.  Mostly, they suggest a willful effort to 
give a muscular hand up to the executive branch. 
V. ENTER JUSTICE STRAS 
There was an unmistakable slant to the media coverage that 
attended Justice David Stras’s appointment to the court at the end 
of the 2009–10 term.  Most commentators expected that Justice 
Stras’s addition would continue or even hasten the court’s 
conservative momentum.105  These prognostications appeared to 
 
 101. Id. at 374 (Gildea, J., dissenting). 
 102. Id. at 361 (majority opinion). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See, e.g., Elizabeth Dunbar & Tim Nelson, Gildea Named to Take Magnuson’s 
Place on High Court, MINN. PUB. RADIO, May 13, 2010, http://minnesota.publicradio.org
/display/web/2010/05/13/magnuson-replacement; Rochelle Olson, Pawlenty’s Picks 
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have less to do with Justice Stras’s scholarly work than with his 
resume.   
Following law school, Justice Stras clerked for two federal 
appellate judges.106  The first was Judge Melvin Brunetti of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, accorded by 
his former law clerks—not necessarily an impartial constituency—
as a conservative but non-ideological jurist.107  Then, Justice Stras 
clerked for Judge J. Michael Luttig of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.  During the presidency of George 
W. Bush, Judge Luttig made the White House’s short list for the 
United States Supreme Court seats that wound up going to Chief 
Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito.108  Judge Luttig sat 
on the Fourth Circuit bench for fifteen years.109  Forty of his law 
clerks graduated to clerkships at the United States Supreme Court 
and thirty-three of the forty worked for either Justices Thomas or 
Scalia.110  One of these was Justice David Stras, who clerked for 
Justice Thomas during the 2002–03 Supreme Court term.111   
Justice Thomas is, famously, conservative.  “[P]robably the 
most conservative justice,” writes Jeffrey Toobin, “since the Four 
Horsemen, FDR’s nemeses, retired during the New Deal.”112  Justice 
Thomas has stated publicly that he has no interest in hiring law 
clerks who do not share his ideology: “I won’t hire clerks who have 
profound disagreements with me,” he told an audience at the 
National Center for Policy Analysis, a conservative think tank.  “It’s 
like trying to train a pig.  It wastes your time and aggravates the 
 
Keep High Court Tilting Right, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), May 13, 2010, at 1A; Barbara 
L. Jones, New Minnesota Chief Hailed: Gildea is Smart, Articulate––and Conservative, 
MINN. LAWYER, May 17, 2010; Doug Grow, Pawlenty’s 2 Supreme Court Choices Cement a 
Key Part of His Legacy,” MINN. POST, May 13, 2010, http://www.minnpost.com
/politicalagenda/2010/05/13/18163/pawlentys_2_supreme_court_choices_cement
_a_key_part_of_his_legacy.    
 106. Judge Profile: Associate Justice David R. Stras, MINN. JUDICIAL BRANCH, 
http://www.mncourts.gov/?page=JudgeBio_v2&menu=appellate&ID=30536 (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2010). 
 107. See Christopher D. Sullivan, Eugene S. Litvinoff & Mark J. Seifert, In 
Memoriam: Judge Melvin T. Brunetti: Bringing Life to a Democratic Rule of Law, 61 
HASTINGS L.J. 1503, 1528 (2010). 
 108. See JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE 272–75 (2007). 
 109. Adam Liptak, A Sign of Court’s Polarization: Choice of Clerks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
7, 2010, at A1. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See Judge Profile, supra note 106. 
 112. See TOOBIN, supra note 108, at 99. 
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pig.”113   
During Justice Stras’s term as a law clerk with Justice Thomas, 
the Court voted 6-3 in Lawrence v. Texas114 to invalidate Texas’s ban 
on same-sex sodomy.  Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia and 
Chief Justice Rehnquist in dissent.115  Also during the 2002–03 
term, the Court decided a pair of cases involving the use of racial 
preferences in admissions at the University of Michigan.  The Court 
upheld the law school’s individualized policy in Grutter v. 
Bollinger,116 and it struck down the undergraduate college’s strictly 
numerical policy in Gratz v. Bollinger.117  Justice Thomas dissented in 
Grutter.  “The majority upholds the Law School’s racial 
discrimination,” he chafed, “not by interpreting the people’s 
Constitution, but by responding to a faddish slogan of the 
cognoscenti.”118 
The unfortunate “cognoscenti” to the contrary 
notwithstanding, is it fair to base predictions about an individual’s 
leanings on the views of his prior employers? 
Justice Stras’s own writings are amiably esoteric and 
technocratic.  Are senior judges unconstitutional?119  Should 
Supreme Court justices ride circuit once again?120  Is there an 
algorithm that explains plurality decision-making?121  Was Pierce 
Butler anything other than entirely forgettable?122  As a law 
professor,123 Justice Stras appeared to be primarily interested in 
federal courts, both as institutional and economic organisms.  
Given his scholarly preoccupations, it is something of a surprise 
that he is drawn to service in the state court system, where even at 
 
 113. Id. at 101. 
 114. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 115. Id. at 586. 
 116. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 117. 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 118. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 350. 
 119. David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 453 (2007). 
 120. David R. Stras, Why Supreme Court Justices Should Ride Circuit Again, 91 
MINN. L. REV. 1710 (2007). 
 121. David R. Stras & James F. Spriggs, II, Explaining Plurality Decisions, 99 GEO. 
L.J. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=1562737. 
 122. David R. Stras, Pierce Butler: A Supreme Technician, 62 VAND. L. REV. 695 
(2009). 
 123. Justice Stras was a member of the faculty of the University of Minnesota 
from 2004 until his appointment to the Minnesota Supreme Court in 2010.  Judge 
Profile, supra note 106. 
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the supreme court level, judges cannot avoid the commonplace 
grind of private litigation.  In any event, Stras’s scholarship focuses 
on institutions, rather than on discrete legal concepts or 
developments.  It does not clearly augur who he will become as a 
justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION   
Brayton and Peck expose incongruities of means and end on the 
part of the court’s minimalists.  Their object, they say, is to reduce 
their own imprint and vindicate the preferences of the other 
branches.  However, the Brayton dissenters are only able to launch 
themselves into a pietistic criticism of the majority’s actions by 
taking inordinate liberties with the facts and the law.  The Peck 
majority’s idea of effectuating a statute’s plain meaning guts a 
carefully conceived statutory scheme.  Statutory construction 
became an increasingly myopic and concrete enterprise during the 
2009–10 term of the Minnesota Supreme Court. 
Going forward, the court’s approach to ambiguity is likely to 
serve as a bellwether of its philosophical orientation.  If the court’s 
ambiguity determinations simply import statutory meanings from 
dictionaries, and if they collapse ambiguity identification and 
resolution into a single feckless stroke, then it will be an unhappy 
development for Minnesota law, which has always contemplated 
that words in statutes have a communal existence.   
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VII. APPENDIX: VOTING COUNT OF THE MINNESOTA SUPREME 
COURT IN CRIMINAL CASES FROM 2009–10 
Case 
Name and 
Original 
Date 
Appeal 
Comes 
From 
Prevailing 
Party 
Majority
/Pluralit
y Author 
Concurrence
/Dissent 
Authors 
Decision 
State v. 
Williams, 
771 
N.W.2d 
514 
(Minn. 
2009) 
(9/3/09) 
COA
124
 State J. 
Dietzen 
Unanimous 7-0 
Holt v. 
State, 772 
N.W.2d 
470 
(Minn. 
2009) 
(9/3/09) 
PC
125
/1
°M
126
 
State J. Meyer J. Page 
dissents, J. P. 
Anderson 
joins 
5-2 
State v. 
Davis, 773 
N.W.2d 
66 (Minn. 
2009) 
(9/10/09) 
COA State J. Gildea J. Page 
dissents 
6-1 
State v. 
Jones, 772 
N.W.2d 
496 
(Minn. 
2009)  
(9/10/09) 
COA State J. G.B. 
Anderso
n 
J. Page 
dissents ; 
J. Meyer 
dissents, J. P. 
Anderson 
joins 
4-3 
State v. DA
127
/1 State J. G. Unanimous 7-0 
 
 124. COA: Court of Appeals. 
 125. PC: Post-Conviction Relief. 
 126. 1°M: First Degree Murder. 
25
Weissenborn: Rocks rather than Cathedrals: The Minimalist Architecture of the
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
  
2011] ROCKS RATHER THAN CATHEDRALS 907 
Buckingh
am, 772 
N.W.2d 
64 (Minn. 
2009)  
(9/10/09) 
°M Barry
Anderso
n 
Doppler 
v. State, 
771 
N.W.2d 
867 
(Minn. 
2009)  
(9/10/09) 
PC/1°
M 
State J. 
Dietzen 
J. P. 
Anderson 
concurs in 
part, dissents 
in part, JJ. 
Meyer and 
G. Barry 
Anderson 
join 
4-3 
State v. 
Martin, 
773 
N.W.2d 
89 (Minn. 
2009) 
(10/8/09) 
DA/1°
M 
State J. 
Dietzen 
J. Page 
dissents, J. P. 
Anderson 
joins 
5-2 
State v. 
Jackson, 
773 
N.W.2d 
111 
(Minn. 
2009)  
(10/8/09) 
(co-def 
Martin) 
DA/1°
M 
State J. 
Dietzen 
J. Page 
incorporates 
Martin 
dissent, J. P. 
Anderson 
joins 
5-2 
State v. 
Johnson, 
773 
N.W.2d 
81 (Minn. 
2009)  
(10/8/09) 
DA/1°
M 
State C.J. 
Magnuso
n 
Unanimous 
 
7-0 
 
 127. DA: Direct Appeal. 
26
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss2/10
  
908 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:2 
State v. 
Rourke, 
773 
N.W.2d 
913 
(Minn. 
2009) 
(10/22/09) 
COA State J. G. 
Barry 
Anderso
n 
J. Gildea 
concurs;  
J. P. 
Anderson 
dissents 
5-1 in 
final 
vote
128
 
4-2 in 
opinion 
State v. 
Peck, 773 
N.W.2d 
768 
(Minn. 
2009)  
(10/22/09) 
COA State J. G. 
Barry 
Anderso
n 
J. P. 
Anderson 
dissents, JJ. 
Page, Meyer 
join 
4-3 
State v. 
Fardan, 
773 
N.W.2d 
303 
(Minn. 
2009)  
(10/22/09) 
DA/1° 
M 
State (court 
vacates 
surplus 
convictions)
J. Gildea J. Page 
concurs, J. P. 
Anderson 
joins; 
 J. Meyer 
dissents 
6-1 in 
final 
vote 
4-3 in 
opinion 
State v. 
Vang, 774 
N.W.2d 
566 
(Minn. 
2009)  
(10/29/09) 
DA/PC
/1° M 
State J. 
Dietzen 
Unanimous 7-0 
State v. 
Vang, 774 
N.W.2d 
566 
(Minn. 
2009) 
(10/29/09) 
DA/1°
M 
State J. 
Dietzen 
Unanimous 7-0 
State v. 
Schlienz, 
COA Defendant J. Page Unanimous 7-0 
 
 128. Justice Page did not take part. 
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774 
N.W.2d 
361 
(Minn. 
2009)  
(11/5/09) 
State v. 
Atkinson, 
774 
N.W.2d 
584 
(Minn. 
2009) 
(11/5/09) 
DA/1°
M 
State J. Page Unanimous 7-0 
State v. 
Edwards, 
774 
N.W.2d 
596 
(Minn. 
2009)  
(11/19/09) 
COA State J. 
Dietzen 
J. Page 
dissents, JJ. 
P. Anderson, 
Meyer join 
4-3 
State v. 
Pearson, 
775 
N.W.2d 
155 
(Minn. 
2009)  
(11/25/09) 
DA/PC
/1°M 
State J. Meyer J. Page 
concurs 
7-0 in 
final 
vote 
6-1 in 
opinion 
State v. 
Riddley, 
776 
N.W.2d 
419 
(Minn. 
2009)  
(11/25/09) 
DA/1°
M 
State J. P. 
Anderso
n 
Unanimous 7-0 
State v. 
Back, 775 
N.W.2d 
866 
COA Defendant J. Gildea Unanimous 7-0 
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(Minn. 
2009)  
(12/10/09) 
State v. 
Sanders, 
775 
N.W.2d 
883 
(Minn. 
2009)  
(12/17/09) 
COA State J. G. 
Barry 
Anderso
n 
J. P. 
Anderson 
concurs; 
J. Page 
dissents, J. 
Meyer joins 
5-2 in 
final 
vote 
4-3 in 
opinion 
State v. 
Loving, 
775 
N.W.2d 
872 
(Minn. 
2009) 
(12/17/09) 
DA/1°
M 
State J. G. 
Barry 
Anderso
n 
Unanimous 7-0 
State v. 
Stein, 776 
N.W.2d 
709 
(Minn. 
2010)  
(1/07/10) 
COA State C.J. 
Magnuso
n 
J. 
P.Anderson 
concurs, J. 
Meyer joins; 
J. Meyer 
concurs, JJ. 
Page, P. 
Anderson 
join 
6-0 in 
final 
vote
129
 
3-3 in 
opinion 
Walen v. 
State, 777 
N.W.2d 
213 
(Minn. 
2010)  
(1/14/10) 
PC/1°
M 
State J. P. 
Anderso
n 
Unanimous 7-0 
State v. 
McDaniel, 
777 
N.W.2d 
DA/1°
M 
State C.J. 
Magnuso
n 
Unanimous 7-0 
 
 129. Justice Dietzen did not take part. 
29
Weissenborn: Rocks rather than Cathedrals: The Minimalist Architecture of the
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
  
2011] ROCKS RATHER THAN CATHEDRALS 911 
739 
(Minn. 
2010)  
(1/21/10) 
State v. 
Fleck, 777 
N.W.2d 
233 
(Minn. 
2010) 
(1/21/10) 
COA State J. Page Unanimous 7-0 
Moua v. 
State, 778 
N.W.2d 
286 
(Minn. 
2010) 
(1/21/10) 
PC/1°
M 
State J. Gildea Unanimous 7-0 
State v. 
Raleigh, 
778 
N.W.2d 
90 (Minn. 
2010)  
(2/4/10) 
DA/1°
M 
State J. Meyer Unanimous 7-0 
State v. 
Lopez, 
778 
N.W.2d 
700 
(Minn. 
2010)  
(2/11/10) 
COA Defendant C.J. 
Magnuso
n 
Unanimous 7-0 
State v. 
Tomasson
i, 778 
N.W.2d 
327 
(Minn. 
2010)  
(2/18/10) 
DA/1°
M 
State C.J. 
Magnuso
n 
Unanimous 7-0 
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State v. 
Holmes, 
778 
N.W.2d 
336 
(Minn. 
2010)  
(2/25/10) 
COA State J. 
Dietzen 
Unanimous 7-0 
State v. 
Lessley, 
779 
N.W.2d 
825 
(Minn. 
2010)  
(3/11/10) 
COA 
(writ 
prohibi
tion) 
Defendant J. P. 
Anderso
n 
J. Gildea 
dissents, J. 
Dietzen joins
5-2 
State v. 
Cox, 779 
N.W.2d 
844 
(Minn. 
2010)  
(3/18/10) 
DA/1°
M  
Defendant J. P. 
Anderso
n 
Unanimous 7-0 
State v. 
Matthews, 
779 
N.W.2d 
543 
(Minn. 
2010)  
(3/18/10) 
DA/1°
M 
State J. 
Dietzen 
Unanimous 7-0 
Ferguson 
v. State, 
779 
N.W.2d 
555 
(Minn. 
2010)  
(3/25/10) 
PC/1°
M  
Defendant J. Gildea Unanimous 7-0 
State v. 
Wertheim
COA Defendant J. B. 
Anderso
Unanimous 7-0 
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er, 781 
N.W.2d 
158 
(Minn. 
2010)  
(4/22/10) 
n
State v. 
Carufel, 
783 
N.W.2d 
539 
(Minn. 
2010)  
(4/29/10) 
COA State J. 
Dietzen 
J. P. 
Anderson 
concurs; 
J. Page 
concurs 
7-0 in 
final 
vote 
5-2 in 
opinion 
State v. 
Her, 781 
N.W.2d 
869 
(Minn. 
2010)  
(5/6/10) 
Reman
d from 
U.S. 
Suprem
e Court 
after 
DA/1°
M 
State J. Gildea J. Page 
dissents, J. P. 
Anderson 
joins 
5-2 
Hannon 
v. State, 
781 
N.W.2d 
887 
(Minn. 
2010) 
(5/13/10) 
PC/1°
M 
State J. P. 
Anderso
n 
Unanimous 7-0 
Francis v. 
State, 781 
N.W.2d 
892 
(Minn. 
2010) 
(5/13/10) 
PC/1°
M 
State J. 
Dietzen 
Unanimous 7-0 
State v. 
Jenkins, 
782 
N.W.2d 
DA/1°
M 
State J. Page Unanimous 7-0 
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211 
(Minn. 
2010)  
(5/20/10) 
State v. 
Stone, 
784 
N.W.2d 
367 
(Minn. 
2010)  
(6/30/10) 
COA State J. G. 
Barry 
Anderso
n 
Unanimous 7-0 
State v. 
Finnegan, 
784 
N.W.2d 
243 
(Minn. 
2010)  
(6/30/10) 
PC/1°
M 
State J. Gildea J. Meyer 
dissents, JJ. 
Page, P. 
Anderson 
join; 
J. P. 
Anderson 
dissents, JJ. 
Meyer, Page 
join 
4-3 
State v. 
Chavarria-
Cruz, 784 
N.W.2d 
355 
(Minn. 
2010) 
(6/30/10) 
COA Defendant C.J. 
Magnuso
n 
J. Gildea 
concurs, J. 
Dietzen joins
7-0 in 
final 
vote 
5-2 in 
opinion 
State v. 
Andersen, 
784 
N.W.2d 
320 
(Minn. 
2010)  
(6/30/10) 
DA/1°
M 
State J. G. 
Barry 
Anderso
n 
J. Page 
concurs, JJ. 
Meyer, P. 
Anderson 
join; 
J. Meyer 
concurs, JJ. 
Page, P. 
Anderson 
join 
7-0 in 
final 
vote 
4-3 in 
opinion 
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State v. 
Prtine, 
784 
N.W.2d 
303 
(Minn. 
2010)  
(6/30/10) 
DA/1°
M 
State/ 
Defendant 
(remand on 
issue 
whether D 
consented 
to counsel’s 
concession 
of guilt) 
J. Page J. Gildea 
concurs in 
part, dissents 
in part, 
joined by J. 
Dietzen; 
joined in 
part by J. P. 
Anderson 
4-3 
Staunton 
v. State, 
784 
N.W.2d 
289 
(Minn. 
2010) 
(6/30/10) 
DA/1°
M 
State J. G. 
Barry 
Anderso
n 
Unanimous 7-0 
 
 
 
 
34
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss2/10
